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Abstract
Trial-offer markets, where customers can sample a product before deciding whether to buy it, are
ubiquitous in the online experience. Their static and dynamic properties are often studied by assuming
that consumers follow a multinomial logit model and try exactly one product. In this paper, we study
how to generalize existing results to a more realistic setting where consumers can try multiple products.
We show that a multinomial logit model with continuation can be reduced to a standard multinomial
logit model with different appeal and product qualities. We examine the consequences of this reduction
on the performance and predictability of the market, the role of social influence, and the ranking policies.
1 Introduction
With the ubiquity of online market places such as Amazon and iTunes, there has been increasing interests
in understanding and modeling the behavior of such trial-offer markets, where customers sample a product
before deciding whether to buy it. These online markets are particularly interesting because of their greater
opportunities in shaping the customer experience and their flexibility in exploiting visibility bias Lerman
and Hogg (2014); Buscher, Cutrell, and Morris (2009); Maille´ et al. (2012); Joachims et al. (2005) and
social signals Engstrom and Forsell (2014); Viglia, Furlan, and Ladro´n-de Guevara (2014).
Traditionally, such markets have been studied using extensions of Multinomial Logit Models Krumme et
al. (2012); Lerman and Hogg (2014); Abeliuk et al. (2015); Van Hentenryck et al. (2015); Daly and Zachary
(1978); Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004); Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, and Topaloglu (2010); Rusmevichien-
tong, Shen, and Shmoys (2010), where participants can only sample one product (e.g., listening to a song)
before deciding whether to buy the product. Multinomial Logit Models have been studied in marketing for
several decades Luce (1965), but the addition of social signals has been shown to affect the market behavior
significantly (Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, 2006; Lerman and Hogg, 2014; Abeliuk et al., 2015). Hence it is
interesting to study how these recent results are affected by more realistic settings in which consumers can
try multiple products. Also, experimental analysis using eye-tracking inspired cascade models, introduced
first by Craswell et al. (2008), and showed fit experimental data better than separable models in presence
of position bias. The intuition behind this model, is that users consider products in a top to bottom fashion,
as they were presented in an ordered list, and they only look to the next product if the current one was not
selected.
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This paper is an attempt at generalizing Multinomial Logit Models to account for a richer class of
customer behavior. It endows the Multinomial Logit Model with a notion of continuation, which enables
participants to sample multiple products before making a purchase. The paper studies how this generaliza-
tion affects market efficiency and the role of social influence. The main contributions of the paper can be
summarized as follows:
1. We show that a trial-offer market with continuation can be reduced to a traditional trial-offer market by
adjusting the quality and appeal of the products and we quantify how the continuation model affects
market efficiency;
2. We show that, under a natural continuation model, the quality-ranking policy, where the products are
ranked by quality, is preserved by the reduction, but not the performance ranking, which optimizes the
market performance at each step. We also show that social influence remains beneficial in this setting
under the quality ranking;
3. Finally, we show experimental results that indicate that the popularity ranking, which ranks the prod-
uct by popularity, benefits more from the generalization than the quality and performance ranking,
unless the continuation is strongly dependent of the product just sampled. This improvement however
is not enough to bridge the gap with the performance and quality rankings.
2 Trial-Offer Markets
This paper considers trial-offer markets in which participants can try a product before deciding whether to
buy it. Such settings are common in online cultural markets (e.g., books, songs, and videos). In this paper,
the trial-offer market is composed of n products and each product i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is characterized by two
values:
1. Its appeal Ai representing the inherent preference of trying product i;
2. Its quality qi representing the probability of purchasing product i given that it was tried.
Each participant, when entering the market, is presented with a product list pi: She then tries a product s in pi
and decides whether to purchase s with a certain probability. The product list is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}
and each position p in the list is characterized by its visibility vp > 0 which is the inherent probability of
trying a product in position p. Since the list pi is a bijection from positions to products, its inverse is well-
defined and is called a ranking. We denote rankings by σ in the following, pii denotes the product in position
i of the list pi, and σi denotes the position of product i in the ranking σ. Therefore vσi denotes the visibility
of the position of product i.
The probability of trying product i given a list σ is
pi(σ) =
vσiAi∑n
j=1 vσjAj
.
Given a ranking σ, the expected number of purchases is
λ(σ) =
n∑
i=1
pi(σ) qi. (1)
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The traditional static market optimization problem consists of finding a ranking σ∗ maximizing λ(σ), i.e.,
σ∗ = arg-max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
pi(σ) qi (2)
where Sn represents the symmetry group over {1, . . . , n}. Observe that consumer choice preferences for
trying the products are essentially modeled as a discrete choice model based on a multinomial logit Luce
(1965) in which product utilities are affected by their position.
Social Influence Following Krumme et al. (2012), this paper considers a dynamic market where the
appeal of each product changes over time according to a social influence signal. Given a social signal
d = (d1, . . . , dn), where di denotes the number of purchases of product i, the appeal of i becomes Ai + di
and hence the probability of trying i given a list σ becomes
pi(σ, d) =
vσi(Ai + di)∑n
j=1 vσj (Aj + dj)
.
Note that the probability of trying a product depends on its position in the list, its appeal, and its number
of purchases (di,t) at time t. As the market evolves over time, the number of purchases could dominate
the appeal, and the sampling probability of a product becomes its market share. Without social influence, a
dynamic market reduces to solving the static optimization problem repeatedly. This set-up is the independent
condition.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that the qualities and visibilities are non-
increasing, i.e., q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qn and v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. We also assume that the qualities and
visibilities are known. In practical situations, the product qualities are obviously not known. But, as shown
by Abeliuk et al. (2015), they can be recovered accurately and quickly, either before or during the market
execution. For simplicity, we use ai,t = Ai + di,t to denote the appeal of product i at step t. When the step
t is not relevant, we omit it and use ai instead.
Ranking policies Following Abeliuk et al. (2015), this paper explores several ranking policies. The per-
formance ranking maximizes the expected number of purchases at each iteration, exploiting all the available
information globally, i.e., the appeal, the visibility, the purchases, and the quality of the products. More
precisely, the performance ranking at step k produces a ranking σ∗k defined as
σ∗k = arg-max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
pi(σ, dk) · qi
where dk = (d1,k, . . . , dn,k) is the social influence signal at step k. The performance ranking uses the
probability pi(σ, dk) of trying products i at iteration k given ranking σ, as well as the quality qi of product i.
The performance ranking can be computed in strongly polynomial time and the resulting policy is scalable
to large markets Abeliuk et al. (2015). The quality ranking simply orders the products by quality, assigning
the product of highest quality to the most visible position and so on. With the above assumptions, a quality
ranking σ satisfies σi = i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The popularity ranking was used by Salganik, Dodds, and
Watts (2006) to show the unpredictability caused by social influence in cultural markets. At iteration k,
the popularity ranking orders the products by the number of purchases di,k, but these purchases do not
necessarily reflect the inherent quality of the products, since they depend on how many times the products
were tried. We also follow Abeliuk et al. (2015) and use Q-RANK, D-RANK, and P-RANK to denote the
policies using the quality, popularity, and performance rankings respectively. We also use R-RANK to denote
the policy that simply presents a random order at each period.
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3 Trial-Offer Markets With Continuation
The main goal of this paper is to study trial-offer markets with continuation, i.e., a setting where market
participants can continue shopping even when they decline to purchase the product just sampled. We model
such a trial-offer market by adding a continuation probability
ci = f(·)(1− qi) (3)
to continue shopping after a participant has declined to purchase product i. In the above probability, the
(1 − qi) term represents the fact that the participant has declined to purchase product i and the f(·) term
represents a function that might depend on the product quality, the current position, or even on another
overall measure (or a combination of all these factors). Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of a trial-
offer market with continuation. It uses ci = 1 − ci to denote the probability that a participant leaves the
market place after sampling product i.
The expected number of purchases in the static version of the trial-offer market with continuation for a
ranking σ is denoted by λ(σ) and defined by
λ(σ) =
n∑
i=1
pi(σ)(qi + ciλ(σ)) (4)
Our primary objective is to maximize market efficiency, i.e., the expected purchases:
σ∗ = arg-max
σ∈Sn
λ(σ). (5)
Note that the higher this objective is, the lower the probability that consumers try a product but then de-
cide not to purchase it. Hence, if we interpret this last action as an inefficiency, maximising the expected
efficiency of the market minimizes unproductive trials.
This paper proves a number of results when the continuation ci depends polynomially on qi, i.e.,
ci = ρq
r
i (1− qi) (6)
where ρ ≤ 1 controls the overall tendency to continuation and r ≥ 0 represents the influence of q. This
choice is justified intuitively by the fact that a market participant is more likely to continue sampling if the
product she tried is of high quality, because it reflects on how good the other products potentially are. Figure
2 depicts various choices of ρ and r.
4 Reduction to the Trial-Offer Model
This section shows that the trial-offer market with continuation can be reduced to a trial-offer market. In-
deed, rearranging the terms in Equation 4 leads to
λ(σ) =
n∑
i=1
pi(σ)(qi + ciλ(σ))
λ(σ) =
∑n
i=1 pi(σ)qi
1−∑ni=1 pi(σ)ci
Defining
pi(σ) =
pi(σ)
1−∑ni=1 pi(σ)ci (7)
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Figure 1: A Trial-Offer Market with Continuation.
we obtain
λ(σ) =
n∑
i=1
pi(σ) qi
By definition of pi(σ), we have
pi(σ) =
vσiai∑n
i=1 vσiai
· 1
1−∑ni=1(ci · vσiai∑n
i=1 vσiai
)
pi(σ) =
vσiai∑n
i=1(1− ci)vσiai
Now, by defining ai = ai(1− ci) and qi = qi(1−ci) , we obtain
λ(σ) =
n∑
i=1
vσiai qi∑n
i=1 vσiai
We have proven the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. A trial-offer market with continuation can be reduced to a trial-offer market by using the
product qualities qi and appeals ai defined as follows:
qi =
qi
1− ci
ai = ai(1− ci).
In the following, qi and ai are called the continuation qualities and continuation appeals, and Figure 3
depicts the continuation quality for different values of ρ and r. Observe how the continuation model typically
5
Figure 2: Examples of the continuation probabilities for different values of ρ and r; the r parameter defines
where the peak is (the maximum is always attained at q = rr+1 ), and ρmodulates how strong the continuation
is.
boosts the quality of the products, sometimes substantially. To understand this reduction intuitively, we can
rewrite Equation 7 as:
pi(σ) = pi(σ) ·
∞∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
pi(σ)ci)
j
The value pi(σ) can thus be interpreted as the probability of sampling product i in any number of steps.
The rewriting uses the fact that
∑n
i=1 pi(σ)ci < 1 to obtain an infinite sum and the term (
∑n
i=1 pi(σ)ci)
j
captures all the possible ways to sampling i in j steps.
5 Properties of the Market
Market Efficiency: The first result links the expected number of purchases of the market with and without
continuation under the performance ranking.
Theorem 5.1. Let pi∗c and pi∗ be optimal permutations for the trial-offer markets with and without continu-
ation. Then,
λ(pi∗) ≤ λ(pi∗c ) ≤
λ(pi∗)
1−max
i
ci
.
6
Figure 3: Continuation qualities for different values of the ρ and r parameters; the lager ρ is, the more
concave the continuation quality becomes.
Proof. The lower bound can be derived as follows:
λ(pi∗) =
∑n
i=1 viapi∗i qpi∗i∑n
i=1 viapi∗i
λ(pi∗) =
∑n
i=1 viapi∗i qpi∗i∑n
i=1 viapi∗i
· 1−
∑n
i=1 pi(pi
∗)cpi∗i
1−∑ni=1 pi(pi∗)cpi∗i
λ(pi∗) =
∑n
i=1 pi(pi
∗)qpi∗i
1−∑ni=1 pi(pi∗)cpi∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ(pi∗)
(1−
n∑
i=1
pi(pi
∗)cpi∗i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
λ(pi∗) ≤ λ(pi∗) ≤ λ(pi∗c )
where the last inequality holds because of optimality of pi∗c for λ(·). The upper bound follows from
λ(pi∗c ) ≤ λ(pi∗c ) ·
1
1−∑ni=1 picpi∗i ≤ λ(pi∗) · 11−maxi ci .
The following corollary considers the case where continuations depend polynomially on qualities (a proof
is provided in the Appendix).
Corollary 5.1. Assume that ci = ρqri (1− qi). It follows that
λ(pi∗) ≤ λ(pi∗c ) ≤ λ(pi∗)
1
1− ρrr
(r+1)r+1
(8)
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When ρ = 1 and r = 1, λ(pi∗c ) ≤ 43 · λ(pi∗) indicating a market that is at most 33% more efficient.
Prior work on trial-offer markets with the social influence signal considered here has shown that the
quality ranking is asymptotically optimal Van Hentenryck et al. (2015): The market converges towards a
monopoly for the product of highest quality. We now show that, when the continuations are polynomial
in product qualities, the quality ranking is preserved by the reduction and hence the two markets, with and
without continuation, converge to the same equilibrium in market shares.
Proposition 5.2. Let ci = ρqri (1− qi) with ρ ∈ (0, 1) and r ≥ 0. Then qi ≤ qj ⇔ qi ≤ qj .
Proof. It is sufficient to show that qi, when viewed as a function of qi, is increasing in (0, 1). Consider such
function
h(x) =
x
1− ρxr(1− x)
and its derivative
dh(x)
dx
=
ρxr [(r − 1)− rx] + 1
((1− ρxr(1− x))2 .
The denominator is greater than zero, so it remains to show that the numerator also is. The term ρxr is
increasing in x and the term [(r − 1)− rx] is a line decreasing in x. The product is minimized when x = 1,
in which case the product has a value of −ρ. Since ρ ∈ (0, 1), the minimum value of the numerator is
1− ρ ≥ 0, which concludes the proof.
More importantly, it is also possible to show that, under the quality ranking, the probability that the next
purchase is product i is the same in the markets with and without continuation. Hence, from a product
standpoint, the markets behave very similarly.
Proposition 5.3. The probability pi that the next purchase (after any number of steps) is product i is
pi =
viaiqi
n∑
j=1
vjajqj
.
A proof of Propositon 5.3 is given in the Appendix). In contrast, the same results do not hold for the
performance ranking, which may change when a continuation is used, as shown by the following example.
Example 5.1. Consider the following instance with 3 songs:
• Visibilities: v1 = 0.8, v2 = 0.5 and v3 = 0.1
• Qualities: q1 = 0.9, q2 = 0.2 and q3 = 0.6
• Appeals: a1 = 0.9, a2 = 0.1 and a3 = 0.3
• Continuation parameters: ρ = 0.8 and r = 0.7
In this case, the performance ranking for the market without continuation is σ∗ = [1, 2, 3]; It is σ∗c = [1, 3, 2]
for the continuation model.
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Position Bias: This result generalizes the result shown in Van Hentenryck et al. (2015), to the continuation
setting, and it means that we can always benefit from position bias. The formalization of this claim can be
seen below (a proof is provided in the Appendix))
Theorem 5.2. Position bias increases the expected number of purchases under the quality-ranking policy,
i.e., for all visibilities vi, appeals ai, qualities qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and continuation probabilities ci.This is, after
we make the reduction to the Associated Multinomial Logit, we have:∑
i viai qi∑
j vjaj
≥
∑
i ai qi∑
j aj
.
Social Influence: The last result in this section shows that the social influence signals always benefit trial-
offer markets with continuation. The result is independent of the structure of the continuation probabilities.
The proof is a generalization of the result in Van Hentenryck et al. (2015).
Theorem 5.3. The expected marginal rate of purchases is non-decreasing over time for the quality ranking
under social influence in trial-offer markets with continuation.
Proof. Let
E[Dt] =
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
= λ (9)
be the expected number of purchases at time t. The expected number of purchases at time t+ 1 conditional
to time t is
E[Dt+1] =
∑
j
[
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i 6=j viaiqi + vj(aj + 1− cj)qj∑
i 6=j viai + vj(aj + 1− cj)
]
+
[
1−
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
]
·
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
=
∑
j
[
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vj(1− cj)qj∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
]
+
[
1−
∑
j vjajqj∑
i viai
]
· λ
We need to prove that
E[Dt+1] ≥ E[Dt], (10)
which is equivalent to show, using Equation 9, that∑
j
[
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vj(1− cj)qj∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
]
+ [1− λ] · λ ≥ λ
Rearranging the terms, the proof obligation becomes
1∑
i viai
∑
j
[
v2jajqj(1− cj)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
(
qj − λ
)] ≥ 0
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or, equivalently, ∑
j
[
v2jajqj(1− cj)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
(
qj − λ
)] ≥ 0. (11)
Let k = max{i ∈ N |(qi − λ) ≥ 0}, i.e., the largest k ∈ N such that qk ≥ λ. By separating the sum into
positive and negative terms, we obtain
∑
j
[
v2jajqj(1− cj)
(
qj − λ
)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
]
= S+ + S− where
S+ =
k∑
j=1
[
vjqj(1− cj)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
ajvj(qj − λ)
]
,
S− =
n∑
j=k+1
[
vjqj(1− cj)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
ajvj(qj − λ)
]
By definition of k, all the terms in S+ are positive and the terms in S− are negative. Now, by definition of
k and qi = qi(1−ci) , we have
∀i ≤ k : (1− ci) ≤ qi
λ
,
∀i > k : (1− ci) ≥ qi
λ
. (12)
We now compute a lower bound for S+ and S−. For S+, using Equation 12 for j ≤ k, we have
vjqj(1− cj)∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
≤ vjqj∑
i viai + vj
qj
λ
≤ λ · vjqj
λ
∑
i viai + vjqj
≤ λ · vkqk
λ
∑
i viai + vkqk
(13)
The last inequality follows by vi ≥ vk and qi ≥ qk (using Theorem 5.2) and the following property: For all
c > 0 and x ≥ y ≥ 0,
x
c+ x
≥ y
c+ y
⇔ (c+ y)x ≥ (c+ x)y ⇔ cx ≥ cy ⇔ x ≥ y.
For S−, consider the following expression for j > k:
λ(
∑
i
viai) [vjqj − vkqk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+vkqk [vjqj − λvj(1− cj)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Here the first term is greater or equal than zero because vj ≥ vk and qj ≥ qk using Theorem 5.2 again. The
second term is also greater than zero because it can be lower-bounded (using Equation 12) by:
vjqj − λvjqj
λ
= 0.
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Hence,
λ(
∑
i
viai)[vjqj − vkqk] + vkqk[vjqj − λvj(1− cj)] ≥ 0
vjqj [λ(
∑
i
viai) + vkqk] ≥ λvkqk[
∑
i
viai + vj(1− cj)]
⇔ vjqj∑
i viai + vj(1− cj)
≥ λvkqk
λ
∑
i viai + vkqk
(14)
Putting together Equations 13 and 14 gives us a lower bound to S+ + S−:
S+ + S− =
λvkqk
λ
∑
i viai + vkqk
·
n∑
i=1
viai(qi − λ) (15)
Now, by definition of λ,
λ =
∑n
i=1 viaiqi∑n
i=1 viai
⇔
n∑
i=1
viai(qi − λ) = 0.
which implies that
λvkqk
λ
∑
i viai + vkqk
·
n∑
i=1
viai(qi − λ) = 0
concluding the proof.
Relationship with the Cascade Model: Observe that the quality ranking over the continuation quality
orders the products in decreasing order of qi1−ci value, which is exactly the adjusted ecpm from Aggarwal et
al. (2008); Kempe and Mahdian (2008) with all the revenues set to 1. Obviously, the quality ranking (when
the continuation probabilities preserve the quality rank in the continuation model), and hence the adjusted
ecpm ranking, are not the best rankings to show to an incoming participant (the performance ranking is), but
our results show that they have nice asymptotic properties.
6 Experimental Results
This section report computational results to highlight the theoretical analysis. The computational results use
settings that model the MUSICLAB experiments discussed in Salganik, Dodds, and Watts (2006); Krumme
et al. (2012); Abeliuk et al. (2015). As mentioned in the introduction, MUSICLAB is a trial-offer market
where participants can try a song and then decide to download it. The experiments use an agent-based
simulation to emulate MUSICLAB. Each simulation consists of N steps and, at each iteration t,
1. we simulate selecting a song i according to the probabilities pi(σ, d), where σ is the ranking proposed
by the policy under evaluation and d is the social influence signal.
2. with probability qi, the sampled song is downloaded, in which case the simulator increases the social
influence signal for song i, i.e., di,t+1 = di,t + 1. Otherwise, di,t+1 = di,t, and if the continuation
model is used, the simulation goes back to Step 1 with probability ci and advances to the next step
otherwise.
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Every T iterations, a new list σ is computed using one of the ranking policies. The experimental setting,
which aims at being close to the MUSICLAB experiments, considers 50 songs and simulations with 20,000
steps. The songs are displayed in a single column. The analysis in Krumme et al. (2012) indicated that
participants are more likely to try songs higher in the list. More precisely, the visibility decreases with
the list position, except for a slight increase at the bottom positions. This paper uses the first setting for
qualities, appeals and visibilities from Abeliuk et al. (2015), where the quality and the appeal are chosen
independently according to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1. In addition, the
experiments consider 12 different continuation probabilities, varying ρ and the power r as shown in Figure
3. The results were obtained by averaging W = 100 simulations.
Parameters P-RANK Q-RANK D-RANK R-RANK
ρ = 0.1, r = 0 5.3% 4.9% 5.8% 7.5%
ρ = 0.1, r = 0.25 4.1% 4.3% 4.9% 5.2%
ρ = 0.1, r = 1 2.2% 2.4% 2.6% 2.5%
ρ = 0.1, r = 2 1.4% 1.4% 0.2% 1%
ρ = 0.5, r = 0 30.6% 31% 38.3% 51.8%
ρ = 0.5, r = 0.25 24.2% 24.6% 28.4% 33.6%
ρ = 0.5, r = 1 13.4% 13.2% 14.8% 12.2%
ρ = 0.5, r = 2 7.2% 7.3% 6.2% 4.6%
ρ = 0.9, r = 0 67.3% 67.7% 93.9% 143.3%
ρ = 0.9, r = 0.25 51.6% 52.1% 65.2% 79.9%
ρ = 0.9, r = 1 26.6% 26.8% 28.5% 24.2%
ρ = 0.9, r = 2 13.6% 13.7% 12.2% 8.3%
Table 1: Improvement in Market Efficiency (in percentage) for the Continuation Model.
Parameters P-RANK Q-RANK D-RANK R-RANK
ρ = 0.5, r = 0.25 13776.1 13804.1 12000.1 9393.8
ρ = 0.5, r = 1 12579.0 12565.5 10643.7 7885.0
ρ = 0.9, r = 0.25 16784.7 16840.9 15435.7 12680.8
ρ = 0.9, r = 1 14041.4 14059.1 11926.5 8741.7
Table 2: Market Efficiency in the Continuation Model.
Table 1 presents results on market efficiency (i.e., the number of downloads) for the trial and offer market
with continuation. The most interesting message from these results, is the observation that the popularity
and random rankings improve more than the performance and quality rankings, unless the quality has less
impact (r = 2, because the continuation is decreasing in r) in the continuation. This can be explained by
the fact that the continuation provides a way to correct a potentially weak ranking. However, as indicated in
Table 2, this correction is not enough to bridge the gap with the performance and quality rankings.
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Figure 4: The Distribution of Downloads Versus Song Qualities for ρ = 0.9, r = 1. The songs on the x-axis
are ranked by increasing quality from left to right. Each dot is the number of download of a product in one
of the 100 experiments.
Figure 4 depicts experimental results on the predictability of the market under the continuation model
under various ranking policies. The figure plots the number of downloads of each song for 100 experiments.
In the plots, the songs are ranked by increasing quality from left to right on the x-axis. Each dot in the
plot shows the number of downloads of a song in one of the 100 experiments. The results are essentially
unchanged when moving from the traditional to a continuation multinomial logit model. The popularity
ranking still exhibits significantly more unpredictability than the performance and quality rankings and the
continuations are not able to compensate for the inherent unpredictability.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Motivated by applications in online markets, this paper generalizes the ubiquitous multinomial logit model
to a setting that allows market participants to sample multiple products before deciding whether to purchase.
The paper showed that trial-offer markets with continuation can be reduced to the original trial-offer model,
transferring many fundamental properties of ranking policies to a more general setting. In particular, the
quality ranking still benefits from position bias and social influence. Moreover, under a general class of con-
tinuations, the quality ranking is also preserved and the market reaches the same asymptotic equilibrium.
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Experimental results shows that the continuation model compensates for some of the weaknesses of the pop-
ularity ranking by boosting its market performance more than the quality and performance ranking, unless
the continuation probability depends too strongly on quality. Our current research aims at generalizing these
results further to hierarchical trial-offer markets.
14
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Appendix
In this section we provide the proofs missing from the main text.
Proof of Corollary 5.1. The proof follows from examining the maximum value for the ci.
max
i
ci = max
i
ρqri (1− qi) ≤ ρ max
x∈[0,1]
xr(1− x) = ρr
r
(r + 1)r+1
where the last equality holds because the maximum value of xr(1− x) is reached when x = rr+1 .
Proof of Corollary 5.1. The probability that product i is purchased in the first step is
p1sti =
viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi,
More generally, the probability that product i is purchased in step m while no product was purchased in
earlier steps is:
pmthi =

n∑
j=1
vjaj(1− qj)
n∑
j=1
vjaj

m−1
viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Defining β = (
n∑
j=1
vjajqj)/(
n∑
j=1
vjaj), Equation 7 becomes
pmthi =
(
1− β
)m−1 viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Hence the probability that the next purchased product is product i is given by
pi =
∞∑
m=0
(
1− β
)m viai
n∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
Given the fact that β < 1 we have:
∞∑
m=0
(
1− β
)m
=
1
β
,
the probability that the next purchase is product i is given by
pi =
n∑
j=1
vjaj
n∑
j=1
vjajqj
· viain∑
j=1
vjaj
qi.
pi =
viaiqi
n∑
j=1
vjajqj
17
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let λ =
∑
i viaiqi∑
j vjaj
be the expected number of purchases for the quality ranking. We
have ∑
i
viai
(
qi − λ
)
= 0.
Consider the index k such that
(
qk − λ
) ≥ 0 and (qk+1 − λ) < 0. Since v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, we have
k∑
i=1
vkai
(
qi − λ
)
+
n∑
i=k+1
vkai
(
qi − λ
) ≤∑
i
viai
(
qi − λ
)
= 0
and, given the fact that vk ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
ai
(
qi − λ
) ≤ 0.
We had the desired result: λ ≥
∑n
i=1 aiqi∑n
i=1 ai
.
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